Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council [2025 INSC 264]

By Anish Sinha

Introduction

The case of Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council presents a critical confrontation between legislative autonomy and constitutional supremacy, raising fundamental questions about the limits of internal disciplinary powers of legislative bodies in a constitutional democracy. At its core, the dispute concerns whether a State Legislature, acting through its Ethics Committee and backed by majority resolution, can impose the extreme penalty of expulsion on a sitting member for disorderly conduct, and whether such an action is immune from judicial review under Article 212 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court’s intervention goes beyond the immediate grievance of an expelled Member of Legislative Council (MLC). It addresses a structurally significant issue: whether proportionality operates as a constitutional constraint on legislative self-discipline, even when the legislature claims exclusive control over its internal proceedings. The Court’s ruling ultimately reaffirms that legislative privilege is not a constitutional blank cheque and that disciplinary actions affecting representation and democratic participation must satisfy constitutional standards of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

Background and Context

The controversy in Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council arose at the intersection of heightened political polarization and the internal disciplinary mechanisms of a constitutional legislative body. The petitioner, an elected Member of the Bihar Legislative Council and Chief Whip of the principal opposition party, found himself subjected to disciplinary proceedings following a turbulent session marked by political realignment within the State government and acrimonious exchanges on the floor of the House. Allegations of disorderly and unparliamentary conduct during the Governor’s Address triggered an inquiry by the Ethics Committee of the Council, culminating in a recommendation of expulsion that was subsequently ratified by a majority resolution of the House.

The decision carried consequences far beyond internal decorum, resulting in the petitioner’s removal from office, declaration of vacancy, and initiation of a bye-election. It was this escalation from disciplinary regulation to effective political disqualification, that transformed what might otherwise have remained an internal legislative matter into a constitutional dispute warranting judicial scrutiny.

1. Political and Institutional Context

Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh, an elected MLC and Chief Whip of the Opposition (RJD), was expelled following allegations of unparliamentary conduct during the Governor’s Address in February 2024. The incident occurred against the backdrop of a volatile political realignment in Bihar, where the ruling coalition shifted, intensifying partisan tensions within the Legislative Council.

The Ethics Committee initiated proceedings after the petitioner allegedly used derogatory language against the Chief Minister, disrupted House proceedings, and later adopted a defiant posture during the enquiry. While another member involved in the same incident expressed remorse and cooperated, resulting in a minor suspension, the petitioner’s conduct before the Committee became a decisive aggravating factor.

• Procedural History

The Ethics Committee recommended expulsion, which was subsequently ratified by a majority of the House. The Secretariat issued a notification declaring the petitioner’s seat vacant, triggering a bye-election. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging both the Ethics Committee report and the consequential notification as unconstitutional, arbitrary, and grossly disproportionate.

Problem Analysis

The dispute in the present case is not confined to the petitioner’s individual conduct or the propriety of legislative discipline in the abstract; rather, it exposes a deeper constitutional tension concerning the limits of institutional self-regulation within a representative democracy. The impugned action compels an examination of how far a legislative body may go in enforcing internal discipline without transgressing constitutional guarantees, particularly when such enforcement results in severe civil and democratic consequences.

What is at stake is the boundary between procedural autonomy and constitutional accountability between the Legislature’s power to preserve its dignity and the judiciary’s duty to ensure that such power is exercised within the confines of legality, fairness, and proportionality. This problem is accentuated when the sanction imposed effectively silences an elected representative and, by extension, the electorate itself, thereby raising concerns that transcend individual misconduct and implicate the structural integrity of democratic governance.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

1. Core Legal Problem

The central problem was whether legislative discipline exercised through expulsion is subject to judicial review, or whether Article 212(1) creates an absolute shield against constitutional scrutiny. Embedded within this was a second, more substantive issue: even if reviewable, can courts examine the proportionality of punishment imposed by a legislative body on its own members?

• Structural Tension: Autonomy vs. Accountability

Legislatures undeniably require autonomy to maintain order and dignity. However, autonomy becomes constitutionally suspect when it transforms into institutional absolutism, especially where disciplinary action produces civil consequences such as loss of office, disenfranchisement of constituents, and erosion of political pluralism.

The respondents’ argument relied heavily on Article 212(1), asserting that courts cannot question legislative proceedings on grounds of procedural irregularity. The Court decisively rejected this absolutist reading, drawing a principled distinction between “proceedings in the legislature” and “legislative or administrative decisions” that have external constitutional consequences.

• Theoretical Lens: Proportionality as a Constitutional Control

The Court framed proportionality not as an imported doctrine but as an organic feature of Indian constitutionalism, operating across service law, administrative law, criminal law, and fundamental rights adjudication. The problem was not whether the petitioner misbehaved on facts, he clearly did but whether expulsion was necessary, justified, and balanced, especially when lesser sanctions were explicitly available under the Rules of Procedure.

Alternatives Considered

Before arriving at its final determination, the judgment necessarily engaged with a set of competing constitutional possibilities, each reflecting a different balance between legislative autonomy and judicial oversight. Although the Court did not formally enumerate these options, its reasoning reveals an implicit evaluation of the available institutional responses to the petitioner’s grievance ranging from complete judicial abstention in deference to legislative privilege, to restrained intervention through remand, and ultimately to calibrated correction through constitutional powers. Articulating these alternatives is essential not to rewrite the judgment, but to clarify the normative choices embedded within it and to demonstrate why the path ultimately adopted was preferred over other legally plausible courses of action. Such an exercise underscores that the outcome was neither inevitable nor mechanical, but the product of a reasoned constitutional judgment sensitive to democratic consequences.

1. One possible course was absolute judicial deference, under which the Court could have declined jurisdiction altogether by treating the impugned expulsion as an internal disciplinary matter immune from scrutiny under Article 212. Such an approach would have preserved legislative autonomy and minimized judicial intrusion into the internal functioning of the House, thereby reinforcing the classical understanding of separation of powers. However, this position carried serious constitutional costs. Granting complete immunity would have enabled the potential misuse of disciplinary authority by a legislative majority, foreclosed judicial remedies against disproportionate sanctions, and undermined fundamental rights by insulating actions producing severe civil consequences from review. It would also have conflicted with settled constitutional precedent holding that legislative privilege cannot operate as a shield for unconstitutional outcomes. For these reasons, the Court rightly rejected absolute immunity as inconsistent with constitutional supremacy.
2. A second alternative lay in setting aside the expulsion and remanding the matter to the Ethics Committee for reconsideration of punishment. This approach would have respected institutional hierarchy and adhered to the conventional principle that courts should not ordinarily substitute their own discretion for that of a designated disciplinary authority. Yet, in the factual matrix of the case, remand was neither neutral nor equitable. The petitioner had already endured prolonged exclusion from the House, his remaining tenure was limited, and continued removal pending reconsideration would have effectively perpetuated the very disproportionality the Court found constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, remand carried the risk of repetition, as the same institutional body would reassess the matter without assurance of substantive recalibration. In these circumstances, remand was found to be an inadequate remedy.
3. The final alternative, which the Court ultimately adopted, involved direct modification of the punishment through the exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142. While this approach necessarily entailed limited judicial intervention into a traditionally legislative domain, it was justified by the need to prevent ongoing constitutional harm. By treating the period already undergone as expulsion as a deemed suspension, the Court ensured immediate relief, avoided further erosion of representative democracy, and preserved institutional discipline without endorsing permanent exclusion. This calibrated substitution reflected a principled balance between restraint and correction, ensuring that constitutional proportionality was enforced without collapsing legislative autonomy.

Recommended Solution (Court’s Reasoning)

The Supreme Court’s resolution of the dispute reflects a carefully structured constitutional response rather than an ad hoc exercise of judicial power. Instead of treating the case as a binary choice between legislative autonomy and judicial intervention, the Court articulated a principled framework that reconciles both by anchoring its reasoning in established constitutional doctrine. The solution adopted is not punitive or indulgent, but corrective and proportionate, aimed at restoring constitutional balance without eroding institutional dignity. This framework rests on three interrelated normative pillars, each of which limits legislative discretion while simultaneously defining the legitimate scope of judicial oversight in matters of internal legislative discipline.

1. Judicial Review is Not Excluded by Article 212: The Court clarified that Article 212 of the Constitution does not impose an absolute bar on judicial review of legislative action, but merely restricts courts from scrutinizing procedural irregularities in the conduct of legislative proceedings. Where a legislative decision travels beyond internal procedure and results in substantive civil consequences such as removal from office, disqualification, or deprivation of representation as it ceases to be immune from constitutional scrutiny. The expulsion of an elected member, the Court held, is not a purely internal matter of decorum but an action with tangible legal and democratic consequences. To treat such decisions as non-justiciable would be to elevate legislative privilege above constitutional supremacy, a position incompatible with the role of the judiciary as the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution.
2. Proportionality Applies to Legislative Discipline: Applying the doctrine of proportionality, the Court emphasized that expulsion is an extreme and exceptional sanction that must be reserved for conduct of the highest gravity. While the petitioner’s behavior was found to be blameworthy and deserving of disciplinary response, the Court held that the punishment imposed must bear a rational and measured relationship to the misconduct proved. The availability of graded sanctions within the legislative framework itself underscored that expulsion was not the only or inevitable response. By imposing the severest penalty without demonstrating why lesser measures were inadequate, the disciplinary action failed the test of proportionality. The Court thus reaffirmed that legislative discipline, like all exercises of public power, must conform to constitutional standards of reasonableness and restraint.
3. Representative Democracy Cannot Be Collateral Damage: A central concern animating the Court’s reasoning was the broader impact of expulsion on representative democracy. The Court observed that removing an elected representative from the House does not merely punish the individual member; it also silences the electorate that placed its trust in that representative. Such an outcome carries systemic implications, particularly in a pluralistic democracy where dissenting and minority voices are integral to legislative functioning. The Court therefore rejected any approach that treats expulsion as a purely internal corrective mechanism divorced from its democratic consequences. Constitutional discipline, the Court made clear, cannot be enforced at the cost of undermining the representative character of legislative institutions or disenfranchising voters without compelling justification.

Plan of Action (Judicial Directions)

Having found the punishment of expulsion to be constitutionally disproportionate, the Supreme Court proceeded to fashion a remedial framework that would correct the illegality without erasing the disciplinary authority of the Legislature. The Court modified the Ethics Committee’s recommendation by treating the period already undergone as expulsion as a deemed suspension, thereby ensuring that the petitioner did not escape the consequences of his misconduct while simultaneously preventing the continuation of an unconstitutional penalty. This approach enabled the Court to restore the petitioner’s membership in the Legislative Council with immediate effect, striking a balance between individual redress and institutional discipline. Importantly, the Court declined to grant back wages or other pecuniary benefits, signaling that judicial intervention was not intended to reward indiscipline but to rectify disproportionality.

In order to give full effect to its decision and prevent irreversible democratic consequences, the Court also quashed the notification declaring the petitioner’s seat vacant and set aside the consequential bye-election process initiated by the Election Commission. This step was necessary to preserve the representative character of the House and to ensure that the judicial finding of illegality was not rendered nugatory by intervening electoral actions. At the same time, the Court issued a clear caution that any future misconduct by the petitioner would invite strict disciplinary action, reaffirming that legislative decorum remains a legitimate and enforceable constitutional concern. Taken together, these directions reflect a calibrated remedial strategy, one that restores constitutional balance without trivializing legislative authority, and corrects excess without substituting judicial will for institutional governance.

Conclusion

This judgment is a landmark assertion of constitutional restraint on legislative excess. It neither trivializes disorderly conduct nor sanctifies legislative absolutism. Instead, it reinforces a vital constitutional truth: discipline without proportionality becomes domination, and autonomy without accountability erodes democracy.

By subjecting legislative punishment to proportionality review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that constitutional morality does not stop at the doors of the legislature. The decision strengthens representative democracy, protects minority voices, and clarifies that institutional power must always remain answerable to constitutional reason.