When Enforcement Meets Federalism: The ED–West Bengal Confrontation under the PMLA

By Anish Sinha

The confrontation between the Enforcement Directorate and the West Bengal executive unfolded not as an abstract constitutional debate, but as a sequence of concrete events that rapidly escalated into a federal and legal crisis. What began as a routine search under a central statute soon drew in the Chief Minister, senior police leadership, the High Court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, forcing judicial scrutiny of both executive conduct and the statutory powers of the Enforcement Directorate under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

On January 8, Enforcement Directorate officials initiated search proceedings in Kolkata at the office of I-PAC, a political consultancy engaged by the ruling Trinamool Congress, and at the residence of one of its functionaries. The searches were conducted in connection with an ongoing money-laundering investigation linked to alleged coal smuggling and related financial transactions. The agency invoked its powers under Section 17 of the PMLA, which permits search and seizure based on internally recorded satisfaction without prior judicial authorization.

According to the Enforcement Directorate, while the search was underway, the Chief Minister of West Bengal arrived at the premises accompanied by senior police officers and a contingent of State personnel. The agency alleges that during this intervention, documents and electronic devices that formed part of the search were removed from the premises, effectively disrupting the exercise of statutory powers. The ED subsequently characterised the incident as deliberate obstruction of a lawful investigation.

The State’s version diverges sharply. The Chief Minister and State authorities have maintained that the materials taken pertained exclusively to political and electoral strategy, unconnected to any alleged proceeds of crime. It was asserted that the ED’s officers exceeded the scope of their authority by accessing confidential party data and that the Chief Minister acted to secure material belonging to the political party rather than interfere with any investigation.

Escalation and Parallel Proceedings

The episode immediately spilled into the judicial arena. The Enforcement Directorate approached the Calcutta High Court seeking protection and directions, while the State police registered multiple FIRs against ED officials alleging misconduct during the operation. These parallel proceedings reflected a breakdown of institutional coordination and raised concerns about retaliatory use of criminal process.

Amid allegations of courtroom disruptions and heightened political mobilisation, the Enforcement Directorate invoked the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32, seeking judicial intervention on the ground that State machinery had actively obstructed a central agency. The agency also sought a CBI investigation into the alleged obstruction and requested a stay on proceedings initiated by the State police.

A bench of the Supreme Court issued notice on the petitions, describing the matter as raising serious questions affecting the rule of law. The Court stayed further proceedings in the FIRs lodged against ED officials and directed preservation of CCTV footage and electronic records relating to the search. These interim measures signalled judicial concern both about possible interference with investigation and the need to safeguard evidentiary integrity.

The Court’s observations reflected a broader constitutional anxiety: whether State authorities can lawfully impede central investigations under the cover of political or administrative authority, and whether failure to address such conduct risks normalising institutional paralysis across states governed by different political parties.

Historical Context and Pattern of Conflict

This confrontation did not arise in isolation. West Bengal has previously witnessed standoffs between central agencies and the State executive, notably during investigations into the Saradha and Narada scams. In one instance, CBI officers were detained by State police while attempting to question senior officials, followed by public protest by the Chief Minister outside a CBI office. These episodes underscore a persistent pattern of resistance to central investigations within the State.

Beyond West Bengal, leaders from multiple opposition-ruled states have alleged selective and politically timed use of agencies such as the ED, CBI, and Income Tax Department. Investigations involving political figures in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Bihar, Maharashtra, and Jharkhand have repeatedly triggered judicial commentary on the need for agencies to act with restraint and neutrality. While allegations of misuse do not by themselves establish illegality, their recurrence has eroded public confidence in the enforcement process.

The legal fulcrum of the present dispute lies in the design of the PMLA itself. Section 17 empowers the ED to conduct searches without a warrant, based on an officer’s recorded “reason to believe.” Judicial oversight is deferred and largely formal, with reasons forwarded post-search to an adjudicating authority in sealed form. Unlike the Criminal Procedure Code, there is no requirement of prior approval from a magistrate or court.

This statutory architecture significantly alters the balance between investigation and individual rights. The absence of ex-ante scrutiny permits expansive searches, particularly of digital data, with limited immediate remedy for those affected. When such powers are exercised in politically sensitive environments, the perception of overreach becomes inevitable.

The broader PMLA framework further intensifies this imbalance through stringent bail provisions, reverse burdens of proof, admissibility of statements recorded by ED officers, and the non-disclosure of the Enforcement Case Information Report. Collectively, these features create an investigative regime where coercive power precedes accountability.

From a constitutional standpoint, the case implicates the duty of State authorities to assist in the enforcement of central law, as well as the obligation of central agencies to respect federal boundaries and procedural fairness. Federalism does not permit States to shield individuals from investigation, nor does it authorise central agencies to operate without sensitivity to constitutional limits.

The Supreme Court has, in past decisions, emphasised that independence of investigation is integral to the rule of law. At the same time, it has cautioned that extraordinary powers must be exercised with proportionality and restraint. The present controversy situates these principles in direct conflict.

Present Status and Broader Consequences

As matters stand, the Supreme Court’s intervention has temporarily stabilised the situation, but the substantive questions remain unresolved. Whether the Chief Minister’s conduct amounted to obstruction, whether the ED exceeded its lawful scope, and whether existing statutory safeguards are adequate will all require careful judicial examination.

More significantly, the episode highlights the structural risk embedded in a legal framework that concentrates enforcement power while postponing oversight. When such power intersects with political rivalry, institutional confrontation becomes almost inevitable.

The events in Kolkata represent more than a clash between personalities or parties. They expose a systemic vulnerability in India’s enforcement and federal architecture. A democracy governed by law cannot depend on restraint alone; it must embed accountability within its statutes.

If federalism is to function as a constitutional principle rather than a political slogan, both central agencies and State executives must operate within clearly defined legal boundaries. The resolution of this case will therefore resonate beyond West Bengal, shaping the future relationship between enforcement power, political authority, and constitutional governance in India.